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ABSTRACT
Courts have traditionally shielded the acts of malapportioned or 
otherwise illegally constituted legislatures from dissolution by
employing the “de facto doctrine,” an ancient common law policy tool
with medieval roots. In its most basic form, the de facto doctrine seeks
to safeguard the acts of unlawful but well-intentioned public officials
from collateral attack out of concern for third-party reliance and a bald 
recognition of necessity. However, the doctrine as traditionally
articulated only serves to validate past official acts; once the official in
question has lost the “color of authority,” the doctrine no longer
affords his actions de facto validity. Although this has not prevented 
courts from extending the doctrine, or something like it, to cover 
prospective acts in certain scenarios, courts have generally avoided 
“taking a look under the hood” and wrestling with the policy concerns
underlying the doctrine to see if they still apply prospectively.
This Note examines the potential use of the de facto doctrine in the
gerrymandering context. Both racial and partisan gerrymandering 
present distinct challenges for courts seeking to prospectively apply the 
de facto doctrine to acts of a state legislature: generally, gerrymanders
are created intentionally, making it harder to apply any “good faith”
exception; illegal gerrymandering by its nature trespasses on important 
constitutional guarantees; and the traditional motivations for the de 
facto doctrine—necessity and reliance—arguably do not apply to
legislation crafted by an unconstitutional government body seeking to 
preserve its power. By examining the historical roots of the doctrine,
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960 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:959
tracing its modern development, and considering its underlying policy 
rationales, this Note seeks to answer two questions: (1) how have courts 
expanded the de facto doctrine and its animating principles
prospectively?; and (2) how do those expansions shape the prospective 
application of the doctrine in the gerrymandering context?
INTRODUCTION
The iniquitous Law, which cut up and severed this 
Commonwealth into Districts . . . inflicted a grievous wound on
the Constitution,—it in fact subverts and changes our Form of 
Government, which ceases to be Republican as long as an  
Aristocratic HOUSE OF LORDS under the form of a Senate 
tyrannizes over the People, and silences and stifles the voice of
the Majority. 
When Tyranny and arbitrary Power thus make inroads upon the 
Rights of the People, what becomes the duty of the citizen? Shall
he submit quietly and ignominiously to the decrees of Usurpers?1 
On August 11, 2016, a federal three-judge panel struck down a set
of North Carolina state legislative redistricting maps2 it later identified 
as one of “the largest racial gerrymanders ever encountered by a 
federal court.”3 Collectively, the unconstitutionally drawn districts 
impacted “nearly 70% of the House and Senate districts, touch[ed] 
over 75% of the state’s counties, and encompass[ed] 83% of the State’s
population—nearly 8 million people.”4 Therefore, the state legislature
elected under this districting scheme acted under “a cloud of 
constitutional illegitimacy” that would only be cured when “new 
1. Editorial, The Gerry-Mander, or Essex South District Formed into a Monster!, SALEM
GAZETTE (Apr. 2, 1813), https://digital.library.cornell.edu/catalog/ss:3293783
[https://perma.cc/48EQ-QA9F].
2. Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117, 176 (M.D.N.C. 2016), aff’d mem., 137 S.
Ct. 2211 (2017). 
3. Covington v. North Carolina, 270 F. Supp. 3d 881, 884 (M.D.N.C. 2017), remanded from
137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017).
 4. Id. at 892. Ultimately, 117 legislative districts had to be redrawn, comprising 68 percent
of the House and 72 percent of the Senate. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. Moore, No.
18 CVS 9806, slip op. at 4 (Wake Cty. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2019), appeal denied, No. 261P18-2 (N.C. 
June 11, 2019). 
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2020] A CLOUD OF CONSTITUTIONAL ILLEGITIMACY 961
elections [were] held under constitutionally adequate districting
plans.”5 
Nevertheless, after two years, two Supreme Court decisions, and 
two failed attempts to force a special election, the same racially
gerrymandered, Republican-dominated legislature remained in 
power.6 And in the interim, it had not been idle—or demure. In fact, 
the legislature had embraced controversial attempts to use its veto-
proof supermajority to shift control of a state elections board from the
state’s Democratic governor to the legislature and institute a voter-ID 
law, only to be judicially rebuffed.7 
Yet, the Republican legislature’s days of politically unchecked
power were numbered, for two reasons. First, nonracially 
gerrymandered state districting maps would finally take effect in 2018.8 
Second, a rumored “blue wave” threatened to unseat Republicans of 
all stripes across the country.9 Due to residual partisan 
gerrymandering, Democrats were not predicted to fully retake either 
state legislative chamber,10 but the Republican party’s iron-clad 
supermajorities were imperiled.11 In anticipation, the state legislature 
proposed a slate of six constitutional amendments to be approved by a 
5. Covington, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 891. In the interim, the state had appealed the decision to
the Supreme Court and lost. Id. at 884. Following this lengthy appeal, plaintiffs sought to truncate
the terms of the state legislators by calling for a special election but were denied by the district
court. Id. This meant that 2018 was the first year that nongerrymandered maps were used to elect 
state legislators. Id. at 889. 
6. See Covington, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 884, 887–88 (describing how the Supreme Court 
vacated the 2016 Covington court’s order for a special election and declining to order a special
election once more); Moore, slip op. at 2–4, 11–12 (noting that the 2018 legislature still suffered
from the constitutional defect found in Covington). 
7. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016)
(finding the proposed voter-ID law “target[ed] African Americans with almost surgical
precision”); Cooper v. Berger, 809 S.E.2d 98, 116 (N.C. 2018) (holding that the state legislature’s
attempt to alter the composition of the Board of Elections “impermissibly interfere[d] with the
Governor’s ability to faithfully execute the laws in violation” of the North Carolina Constitution). 
8. See Covington, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 884 (noting that a constitutionally gerrymandered 
legislature would continue to govern the state until 2018).
 9. See, e.g., Alexi McCammond, Wave Watch: The Blue Wave Is Growing, AXIOS (Oct. 2,
2018), https://www.axios.com/signs-of-a-blue-wave-midterms-0742c13a-c11d-4a90-9794-
438bea036277.html [https://perma.cc/WPX6-8NWP] (noting the strong possibility of a blue wave 
in congressional races). 
10. Michael Bitzer, Some Thoughts on NC Legislative Battles Shaping Up on Nov. 6, OLD N.
STATE POLITICS (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.oldnorthstatepolitics.com/2018/11/some-thoughts-
on-nc-legislative-battles.html [https://perma.cc/D4WZ-N7R8].
 11. Laura Leslie, NC Dems Take Aim at GOP Super-Majorities, WRAL.COM (Oct. 22, 
2018), https://www.wral.com/nc-dems-take-aim-at-gop-supermajorities/17938059 [https://
perma.cc/S84S-7DJT].
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962 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:959
voter referendum, including—unsurprisingly—amendments to shift 
control of a state elections board from the governor to the legislature, 
impose a voter-ID requirement, and strip the governor’s power to fill
judicial vacancies, among others.12 In essence, the oncoming “blue 
wave” had “pushed Republican state legislators to try and cement their 
policies into the state’s constitution,”13 their illegally gerrymandered
advantage notwithstanding.
Legal challenges followed in quick succession.14 Notably, several 
nonprofit groups, including the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”), filed a complaint in 
state court challenging four of the amendments, alleging the proposed 
ballot language was either “vague and intentionally misleading” or 
“vague and incomplete.”15 In addition, the plaintiffs advanced an
alternate theory with ancient roots: that as a result of the federal 
district court’s earlier racial gerrymandering decision, affirmed by the 
Supreme Court, the state legislature was a “usurper” that lacked “any 
de jure or de facto lawful authority” to place constitutional 
amendments before state voters.16 In early 2019, a North Carolina 
Superior Court sided with the plaintiffs, tossing out two popularly 
ratified amendments after finding “[a]n illegally constituted General 
Assembly does not represent the people of North Carolina and is 
therefore not empowered to pass legislation that would amend the 
12. Joel Luther, What Would the Six Constitutional Amendments on the NC Ballot Do?, 
DUKE TODAY (Oct. 25, 2018), https://today.duke.edu/2018/10/what-would-six-constitutional-
amendments-nc-ballot-do [https://perma.cc/CM4J-4XZY].
 13. Reid Wilson, North Carolina GOP Seeks To Remake State Constitution; Dems See Power
Grab, HILL (June 28, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/394650-north-carolina-
gop-seeks-to-remake-state-constitution-dems-see-power [https://perma.cc/3M2L-E9JU]; see also
David A. Graham, The Midterms Could Permanently Change North Carolina Politics, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/11/north-carolinas-
constitutional-amendment-fight/574546 [https://perma.cc/D3WQ-2SF4] (noting that
“Republicans are taking steps that would strengthen the legislature’s authority and therefore their
own grip on the state” by proposing constitutional amendments that “could change the balance 
of power between the governor and the legislature for decades to come, placing and preserving
more authority in Republican hands”).
 14. See, e.g., Cooper v. Berger, No. 18 CVS 9805 (Wake Cty. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2018) 
(challenging proposed election-related state constitutional amendments set to be placed on voting
ballots).
15. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 30, N.C. State Conference of the
NAACP v. Moore, No. 18 CVS 9806 (Wake Cty. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2018).
 16. Id.
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2020] A CLOUD OF CONSTITUTIONAL ILLEGITIMACY 963
state’s Constitution.”17 In doing so, the court revived a doctrinal 
question held in uneasy abeyance for decades: What powers may a
legislature continue to properly exercise after it is found 
unconstitutional?18 
The answer to this question may lie in a set of muddled policy-
driven doctrines dating back to the fifteenth century. The “de facto 
officer doctrine” and its variants have been used as “tool[s] of equity” 
for hundreds of years to affirm the validity of acts executed by public 
officials lacking color of title or authority.19 Over time, litigants and 
courts have invoked these doctrines to protect the decisions of 
unlawfully elected English abbots,20 rulings of judges whose terms of 
office had expired,21 contracts of defectively formed corporations,22 and
reapportionment legislation passed by unconstitutionally 
malapportioned state legislatures,23 among others. Although the
doctrine as traditionally conceived only validates the past acts of 
unlawful officers acting under color of title,24 some courts have 
extended the policy rationales underlying the doctrine to authorize
17. Moore, slip op. at 6, 12 (only two of the four challenged amendments survived a popular
referendum—the voter-ID amendment and another proposing a 7 percent income-tax cap; both
were declared “void ab initio”).
18. This Note use the adjectives “unconstitutional,” “unlawful,” and “illegal” as shorthand
terms to describe public officers lacking color of authority or legislatures constituted in violation
of state or federal law.
19. Aurelius Inv., LLC v. Puerto Rico, 915 F.3d 838, 862 (1st Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 139 S. Ct. 2735 (2019).
 20. See ALBERT CONSTANTINEAU, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND THE DE FACTO DOCTRINE § 5
(1910) (discussing The Abbé de Fontaine, 9 Hen. VI, at 32(3) (1431) (Eng.)). 
21. Cromer v. Boinest, 3 S.E. 849, 853 (S.C. 1887) (“It seems to us, therefore, that Judge
FRASER must be regarded as a de facto judge on the sixth of December, 1886, when the decree
was originally filed in the clerk’s office, and consequently that the decree must be regarded as a 
valid decree of the court of common pleas.”).
22. Duray Dev., LLC v. Perrin, 792 N.W.2d 749, 759 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010). 
23. City of Cedar Rapids v. Cox, 108 N.W.2d 253, 262–63 (Iowa 1961). The Iowa Supreme 
Court held in relevant part: 
The State Constitution vests in the legislative branch of the government the law-
making function, including the making of rules for the representative apportionment 
of the assembly itself. If the judicial branch of government could by decree invalidate
legislative enactments because of the failure of the Legislature to reapportion itself,
chaos would result. We have no intention of attempting any such wholesale destruction
of our statutory law.
Id.
 24. CONSTANTINEAU, supra note 20, § 302 (“The acts of an illegal officer, however, are valid
only when the defects in his title are unknown, for when the public or third persons have or should
have a knowledge that the officer is not an officer de jure, there is no reason for validating his
acts . . . .”).
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964 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:959
prospective actions.25 Determining when and why courts extend these
rationales prospectively, and what lessons they may hold for the
gerrymandering context, is the focus of this Note. 
This centuries-old debate is particularly relevant today for two 
reasons. First, additional gerrymandering decisions are on the 
horizon.26 Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Rucho v. 
Common Cause27 effectively slammed the door on claims of partisan
gerrymandering in federal court,28 plaintiffs are beginning to have
success challenging such gerrymanders in state courts.29 For example, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently invalidated a state-level 
congressional redistricting map in League of Women Voters v. 
Commonwealth30 on the grounds it violated the free-and-equal-
elections clause enshrined in the Pennsylvania Constitution.31 Eleven 
other states have similar free-and-equal-elections clauses in their state 
constitutions,32 meaning the antigerrymandering wave may just be 
getting under way.33 
25. See, e.g., Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 723 (N.J. 1964) (invoking the “need for 
governmental order” underlying the de facto doctrine to justify permitting a malapportioned 
legislature to remain in power).
 26. Partisan Gerrymandering, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., https://www.brennancenter.org/ 
partisan-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/4H3Z-PK9A] (noting the tide on partisan
gerrymandering is shifting, in part thanks to the Supreme Court providing “potential roadmaps
to voters looking for fairer maps”).
27. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
28. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–07 (“[P]artisan gerrymandering claims present political
questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”).
 29. Galen Druke, Partisan Gerrymandering Isn’t the Supreme Court’s Problem Anymore, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 27, 2019, 1:34 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/partisan-
gerrymandering-isnt-the-supreme-courts-problem-anymore [https://perma.cc/U8QZ-FCL9]
(noting that reformers were “first successful” in challenging partisan gerrymandering in
Pennsylvania state court in 2018).
30. League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 821 (Pa. 2018). 
31. Id. (“Such a plan, aimed at achieving unfair partisan gain, undermines voters’ ability to
exercise their right to vote in free and ‘equal’ elections if the term is to be interpreted in any
credible way.”).
32. Joshua A. Douglas, The Right To Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89,
144–49 (2014) (noting the constitutions of Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming include 
similar provisions). 
33. In fact, the first cracks in the dike may already be showing. In September 2019, a North
Carolina superior court threw out the state’s districting maps for partisan gerrymandering. See, 
e.g., Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, slip op. at 10 (Wake Cty. Super. Ct. Sept. 3,
2019). More challenges are likely to follow. Cf. About Gerrymandering, FAIR DISTRICTS PA,
https://www.fairdistrictspa.com/the-problem/about-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/Q993-
LW4L] (noting that both Democrats and Republicans are gearing up for 2020 redistricting that
could result in continued gerrymandering). Whether they are successful may depend in part upon
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The second reason why this issue demands modern attention flows 
from the first: Because gerrymandering decisions are coming, many 
legislatures may be stripped of their de jure authority. If these de facto
bodies attempt to cling to power—as history suggests they will34— 
motivated opponents, in turn, will be only too happy to drag questions 
about their de facto authority into court.35 If this past is any prologue,
courts should be ready to field challenges to reflexive legislative 
attempts to maintain power following a gerrymandering decision and 
explain whether these actions are valid under the de facto doctrine or 
related equitable principles. 
The overwhelming weight of authority suggests the de facto 
doctrine will protect the past acts of illegally constituted legislatures.36 
Otherwise, the American legal system would be in constant danger of
evaporating overnight. This Note attempts to provide a framework 
explaining how unconstitutionally gerrymandered state legislatures
can or cannot act following such an adverse decision. Namely, this Note
argues that, when evaluating challenges to prospective legislative
actions, courts should consider: (1) the act’s legal vehicle; (2) the 
illegally constituted body’s level of involvement; and (3) the nature of 
the act, or what it purports to do. 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the origins and 
policy rationales motivating the de facto doctrine, describes how 
American courts have shaped it, and notes that the doctrine has been 
unevenly expanded to address new and unique crises like legislative 
malapportionment. Part II continues by examining the doctrine’s 
the focus on this Note—judges may be less likely to find illegal gerrymanders if they know a 
hamstrung legislature is the result.
34. For example, anger over the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s partisan gerrymandering
decision quickly spilled into the legislative agenda. Immediately following the judgment, members
of the state legislature threatened members of the state supreme court with impeachment. Marc
Levy, Pa. GOP Moves To Remake State Supreme Court After Gerrymandering Ruling, WASH.
TIMES (June 13, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jun/17/pennsylvania-
republicans-move-remake-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/8J3Q-FGBK]. Shortly thereafter, the
Pennsylvania Senate passed a bill submitting a constitutional amendment for popular ratification
that proposed a dramatic restructuring of the state judiciary by requiring state appellate judges— 
including the supreme court—be elected from judicial districts. Wes Venteicher, Proposal Would
Change Way Judges Are Elected to Pennsylvania’s Highest Courts, TRIB LIVE (June 16, 2018, 9:30
PM), https://triblive.com/state/pennsylvania/13756120-74/proposal-would-change-way-judges-
are-elected-to-pennsylvanias-highest-courts [https://perma.cc/YZ5M-W5T8].
 35. See, e.g., Complaint at 30, N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. Moore, No. 18 CVS
9806 (Wake Cty. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2019) (asking a North Carolina court to “declare that a 
usurper legislature is not empowered to place constitutional amendments” on the 2018 ballot). 
36. See infra Part I.B–C.
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966 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:959
limits. Courts have placed constitutional and structural bounds on the
use of the de facto doctrine in addition to crafting more nuanced,
context-dependent limits in both the retrospective and prospective 
realms. Part III then applies the lessons learned from Parts I and II to
the gerrymandering context by weighing the equities for and against 
applying the doctrine. It establishes that while retrospective actions of 
a gerrymandered legislature should stand, prospective actions are 
more suspect. It then proposes a framework for sifting through the
prospective actions of illegally gerrymandered legislatures to identify
those most in need of judicial scrutiny, before applying it to recent 
actions of the North Carolina legislature as an illustrative example. 
I. THE DE FACTO DOCTRINE(S) 
Depending on one’s perspective, the origins of the de facto
doctrine and its various branchings comprise either a gloriously rich 
vein of judicial policymaking or a hopelessly convoluted collection of 
policy rationales masquerading as legal doctrine. What cannot be 
denied, however, is that the doctrine has persisted for nearly six
centuries because it provides an affirmative answer to a thorny 
question: Are the past acts of public officials who lacked true legal
authority to make them nonetheless valid?37 
This Part explores the origins and evolution of the de facto 
doctrine’s answer to that question. Section A details how underlying 
notions of necessity and reliance have perpetuated the use of the
doctrine in diverse38 and colorful39 circumstances stretching back to
antiquity. Section B examines how American courts have fleshed out 
these doctrinal roots. Finally, Section C describes how the doctrine has 
been periodically expanded to meet bigger and bigger challenges, 
especially during the reapportionment upheavals of the mid-twentieth 
century.40 Although the courts of this era uniformly confirmed that 
37. See CONSTANTINEAU, supra note 20, § 4.
 38. See, e.g., Aurelius Inv., LLC v. Puerto Rico, 915 F.3d 838, 862 (1st Cir.) (using the de
facto officer doctrine to uphold the validity of past acts of the Financial Oversight and
Management Board of Puerto Rico created by PROMESA to help the island restructure its
massive debt), cert. granted sub nom. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius
Inv., LLC, 139 S. Ct. 2735 (2019). 
39. See, e.g., State v. Brennan’s Liquors, 25 Conn. 278, 283 (1856) (holding that an
unqualified constable’s seizure of liquor from a man keeping it in violation of an “act for the 
suppression of intemperance” was nonetheless valid under the de facto officer doctrine). 
40. See infra Part I.C.
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2020] A CLOUD OF CONSTITUTIONAL ILLEGITIMACY 967
illegal legislatures’ past acts were valid, whether these legislatures 
could continue to act was—and remains—hotly debated.
A. Doctrinal Roots: Necessity and Reliance 
The de facto doctrine has deep roots in English common law. The 
first reported use of the doctrine occurred in 1431, when a court 
appeared to uphold the validity of a bond issued by an abbot who lost 
an election yet nevertheless came to occupy the abbotcy.41 Although 
the justifications for this determination were obscure,42 the rationales 
for the doctrine were fleshed out several decades later during the 
chaotic Wars of the Roses, in which the Houses of York and Lancaster 
vied for the throne of England.43 Following the Yorkian ouster of the 
Lancasters in 1461, the House of Parliament passed a statute 
“indemnify[ing] those who had submitted to the [de facto] kings of the
house of Lancaster . . . to provide for the peace of the kingdom.”44 The
alternative—a kingdom-wide witch hunt for disloyal aristocrats and 
commoners alike who, for years, had relied on the laws of the 
Lancasters—would have resulted in “great public mischief.”45 
Although many cases that followed did not concern such weighty 
matters of sovereignty, the English courts continued to invoke the 
practical necessity of acceding to de facto rulings, decrees, and
judgments on which individuals had reasonably relied.46 
The de facto doctrine’s common-sense foundation voyaged with
the British colonists across the Atlantic to put down new roots in the 
American common law tradition.47 Hundreds of early cases adopted 
41. CONSTANTINEAU, supra note 20, § 9 (discussing The Abbé de Fontaine, 9 Hen. VI, at
32(3) (1431) (Eng.)). Although it is not clear the court ever decided the matter, the discussion of
the judges and counsel seem to suggest the issue was resolved in the bondholder’s favor. See id. § 
5. Interestingly, statements of the judges on the court seem to suggest the doctrine was already
well established at the time. See id. (“In every case, if a man be made abbot or parson erroneously,
and then is removed for precontract, or any like matter, yet a deed made by him and the convent,
or by the parson and the patron and the ordinary, is good . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting The 
Abbé de Fontaine, 9 Hen. VI, at 32(3) (Babington, C.J.))). 
42. Kathryn A. Clokey, Note, The De Facto Officer Doctrine: The Case for Continued
Application, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1121, 1125 (1985). 
43. CONSTANTINEAU, supra note 20, § 5.
 44. Id.
45. State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 459 (1871). 
46. See CONSTANTINEAU, supra note 20, § 412 (citing Knowles v. Luce (1580) 72 Eng. Rep. 
473, Moore (K.B.) 110) (holding that tenants were not obliged to inquire into the authority of a 
clerk to preside over a manorial court, even though the clerk did not have express authority from
his lord to do so).
 47. CONSTANTINEAU, supra note 20, § 8.
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968 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:959
the precepts of the doctrine and adapted it for use in a democratic 
republic bereft of kings but replete with public officers.48 But while the 
doctrinal dressings changed, the concerns motivating it did not; the 
purposes of the doctrine remained: (1) avoiding the chaos that would 
result from a widespread “invalidation of all official acts which 
occur[ed] while the [de facto] officer [held] an office”;49 and relatedly,
(2) “protect[ing] the public’s reliance on an officer’s authority
and . . . ensur[ing] the orderly administration of government by
preventing technical challenges to an officer’s authority.”50 In effect, 
the doctrine maintains the status quo and “order and peace [in] 
society” by commanding the respect of de facto entities “until, in some
regular mode prescribed by law, their title is investigated and
determined.”51 
B. An Americanized Doctrine 
American courts have employed the de facto doctrine since the
Founding to recognize the de facto authority of insurrectionist 
governments,52 affirm the validity of corporations organized in a legally 
deficient manner,53 and validate the official acts of certain public 
officers lacking de jure legal authority.54 This Note is primarily
concerned with the development and application of that third category,
termed the de facto officer doctrine.55 This doctrine, in its most general 
48. Id.
 49. In re Pelfrey, 419 B.R. 10, 16 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2009).
 50. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 23 (2019); see also Ryder v. United 
States, 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995) (noting the purpose of the doctrine is avoiding the “chaos that
would result from multiple and repetitious suits challenging every action taken by every official
whose claim to office could be open to question, and seeks to protect the public by insuring the 
orderly functioning of the government despite technical defects in title to office”); 
CONSTANTINEAU, supra note 20, § 3 (noting a related concern in that “were every officer bound 
to uphold or defend his title against every one who might choose to deny or attack it in a collateral
way, he would often be so much thwarted in the performance of his official duties that his
efficiency as an officer might at times be greatly impaired”).
51. Norton v. Shelby Cty., 118 U.S. 425, 441 (1886). 
52. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 732 (1868), overruled in part by Morgan v. United States,
113 U.S. 476 (1885). 
53. In re Hausman, 921 N.E.2d 191, 193 (N.Y. 2009) (“Under very limited circumstances,
courts may invoke the de facto corporation doctrine where there exists (1) a law under which the 
corporation might be organized, (2) an attempt to organize the corporation and (3) an exercise of
corporate powers thereafter.”).
54. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180–81 (1995).
55. However, the lessons from these other distinct doctrinal areas are still relevant to this 
inquiry. Because these sister doctrines are based on similar equitable principles, decisions relating
to de facto corporations and governments may still be informative in cases involving de facto
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2020] A CLOUD OF CONSTITUTIONAL ILLEGITIMACY 969
form, “confers validity upon acts performed by a person acting under 
the color of official title” even if that authority is later discovered to be
deficient,56 so long as those acts “involve[d] the interests of the public 
and third persons.”57 State and federal courts have extended this 
principle to protect public officials of every stripe, including judges,58 
notaries,59 police officers,60 state-environmental-board 
commissioners,61 federal oversight boards,62 and state legislators.63 
To qualify as a de facto officer, one must be in “unobstructed 
possession of an office and discharge its duties in full view of the 
public”64 under the color of authority65 or title,66 though possessing no
right in fact.67 Therefore, “[a] de facto officer is one who enters upon
and performs the duties of his office with the acquiescence of the
people and the public authorities and has the reputation of being the 
officer he assumes to be and is dealt with as such.”68 In addition, the
majority of state and federal courts require the office in question have 
de jure existence,69 meaning the acts of an official occupying an 
unconstitutionally created office are denied de facto protection.70 
Procedurally, the past acts of a de facto officer may not be 
collaterally attacked in court.71 In other words, plaintiffs may not 
“attack government action on the ground that the officials who took 
public officers. See  CONSTANTINEAU, supra note 20, § 2 (noting that while functionaries of de
facto governments and corporations can never become more than de facto officers, similar
principles apply).
 56. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 180–81 (discussing the de facto officer doctrine, in particular).
 57. 67 C.J.S. Officers § 457 (2019).
58. State v. Lewis, 12 S.E. 457, 459 (N.C. 1890). 
59. In re Pelfrey, 419 B.R. 10 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2009) (applying Kentucky law). 
60. Jarrett v. State, 926 So. 2d 429 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
61. Iowa Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Envtl. Prot. Comm’n, 850 N.W.2d 403 (Iowa 2014).
62. Aurelius Inv., LLC v. Puerto Rico, 915 F.3d 838 (1st Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Fin. 
Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 139 S. Ct. 2735 (2019).
63. City of Cedar Rapids v. Cox, 108 N.W.2d 253 (Iowa 1961).
64. Waite v. City of Santa Cruz, 184 U.S. 302, 323 (1902).
65. McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596, 601–02 (1895). 
66. United States ex rel. Doss v. Lindsley, 148 F.2d 22, 23 (7th Cir. 1945); see also United 
States v. Royer, 268 U.S. 394, 397 (1925) (“A de facto officer is one who is surrounded with the 
insignia of office, and seems to act with authority.” (citation and quotations omitted)).
67. State v. O’Reilly, 785 So. 2d 768, 777 (La. 2001). 
68. State v. Staten, 267 N.E.2d 122, 125 (Ohio 1971) (emphasis added), vacated in part on
other grounds, 408 U.S. 938 (1972). 
69. Clifford L. Pannam, Unconstitutional Statutes and De Facto Officers, 2 FED. L. REV. 37, 
51 (1966); see also Norton v. Shelby Cty., 118 U.S. 425, 449 (1886).
 70. Norton, 118 U.S. at 441–42.
71. Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 129 (1891). 
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the action were improperly in office,” although plaintiffs may directly 
attack “the qualifications of [an] officer, rather than the actions taken 
by [said] officer.”72 The latter is generally accomplished via a common 
law quo warranto proceeding.73 In contrast, the actions of a “mere
usurper”—one acting “without any color of right”74—are wholly void75 
and may be attacked directly or indirectly76 at “any time in any 
proceeding.”77 Thus, an individual who was never elected or appointed 
to a public office but assumes its powers nonetheless cannot hide 
behind the de facto officer doctrine.78 But even a usurper may
metamorphize into a de facto officer if “he continues to act for so long
a time, or under such circumstances, as to afford presumption of his 
right to act,”79 though the possession of the office in question “is almost 
universally required to be in good faith.”80 
As may be expected for a six-hundred-year-old common law 
doctrine of equity, additional wrinkles and nuances abound, many of 
which vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Perhaps the most 
important—and most universal—exception necessarily flows from the
color-of-right requirement: once the public becomes aware of an 
officer’s defective authority, the doctrine no longer protects his 
72. Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1496–97 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasis added). 
73. Id. at 1497–98. Quo warranto writs are now statutorily codified in the federal system. Id.
74. City of Baton Rouge v. Cooley, 418 So. 2d 1321, 1324 (La. 1982). 
75. People ex rel. Duncan v. Beach, 242 S.E.2d 796, 801 (N.C. 1978). 
76. Note, The De Facto Officer Doctrine, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 912 (1963).
 77. In re Wingler, 58 S.E.2d 372, 375 (N.C. 1950).
78. Van Amringe v. Taylor, 12 S.E. 1005, 1007 (N.C. 1891).
 79. Id. Kimball v. Alcorn, 45 Miss. 151, 158 (1871); see also CONSTANTINEAU, supra note 20,
§§ 96–108. In State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449 (1871), the Connecticut Supreme Court succinctly 
identified four situations in which courts may appropriately apply the de facto officer doctrine:
when the duties of the officer were exercised (1) “without a known appointment or election, but 
under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people, 
without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to be the officer he assumed to
be”; (2) “under color of a known and valid appointment or election, but where the officer had
failed to conform to some precedent requirement or condition, as to take an oath, give a bond, or
the like”; (3) under the color of a known election or appointment, “void because the officer was
not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason
of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being
unknown to the public”; and (4) “under color of an election or appointment by or pursuant to a
public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such.” Id. at 471–72. 
80. T.C. Williams, Annotation, Presumption and Burden of Proof as to One’s Status as a De
Facto Officer upon Which Validity or Effect of His Act Depends, 161 A.L.R. 967 (2019); see also
Heyward v. Long, 183 S.E. 145, 151 (S.C. 1935) (“It is clear from the authorities cited that a de
facto officer is one who is in possession of an office, in good faith, entered by right, claiming to be
entitled thereto, and discharging its duties under color of authority.”). 
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actions,81 and he becomes a mere usurper, lacking color of right.82 On 
the whole, this inference makes logical sense—the doctrine exists to 
safeguard the interests of those who reasonably relied on an official’s 
actions,83 but one cannot reasonably rely on the actions of those known
to lack the authority to make them.84 However, this exception would 
become an uncomfortable thorn in the side of many courts seeking to 
craft remedies for a new and expansive dilemma—legislative 
reapportionment. 
C. Mission Drift: “Prospective” Expansion 
In the mid-twentieth century, old de facto principles were 
resurrected to confront the scourge of legislative “malapportionment.” 
This elegant phrase describes an ugly practice: the creation or 
preservation of unequally populated electoral districts “so that the 
ratio of representatives to voters varies across districts.”85 Although 
states had enjoyed malapportioned districts for decades, if not 
centuries, the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr86 heralded the 
end of the malapportioned era.87 Following the subsequent widespread 
invalidation of almost every state legislature across the country,88 a 
81. Carroll, 38 Conn. at 467 (“When . . . the public or third persons ha[ve] knowledge that
the officer [is] not an officer de jure, the reason for validating the acts to which they submitted,
or which they invoked, fail[s], and the law no longer protect[s] them.”); see also CONSTANTINEAU, 
supra note 20, § 93 (“It is obvious that there cannot be color of title or authority, when the
pretended official title is known to be bad.”). Although the public may perhaps become aware of
the defect in a variety of ways, one of the most common and widely accepted avenues is an adverse
finding by a court of competent jurisdiction. CONSTANTINEAU, supra note 20, § 94 (“[G]enerally
no color of title or authority can exist after the incumbent’s title has been declared invalid by a
court of competent jurisdiction.”).
 82. Taylor, 12 S.E. at 1007 (“[W]hen, without color of authority, [an individual] simply 
assumes to act, —to exercise authority as an officer,—and the public know the fact, or reasonably
ought to know, that he is a usurper, his acts are absolutely void for all purposes.”).
 83. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (observing a purpose of the de facto officer 
doctrine to be the protection of the public’s reliance on an officer’s authority).
84. Williams v. Boynton, 42 N.E. 184, 186 (N.Y. 1895) (holding that a board-of-supervisors
member’s “color of title was wholly destroyed by a public judicial decision, and he became a mere
usurper and intruder whose act was challenged at the moment it was done”); see also
CONSTANTINEAU, supra note 20, § 305 (“[O]ne cannot set up his belief in the legality of
something which he positively knows not to be legal.”).
85. Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 785 n.20 (2005). 
86. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (holding that an equal protection challenge to the 
constitutionality of a state reapportionment statute presented a justiciable, nonpolitical question).
 87. Id.
 88. Edward N. Beiser, The Status of a Malapportioned Legislature, 72 DICK. L. REV. 553, 570
(1968) (observing that the Supreme Court’s follow-up decision to Baker—Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U.S. 533 (1964)—invalidated the legislatures of most states).
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spate of plaintiffs used the opportunity to collaterally challenge prior 
legislative actions ranging from the enactment of a larceny statute89 to
the passage of an act prohibiting discrimination in commercial 
housing.90 Courts uniformly invoked the de facto doctrine to validate 
the past acts of these now-illegal legislatures,91 often citing familiar 
concerns about attendant chaos and the need to maintain law and
order.92 
In contrast, both state and federal courts struggled to determine
what to do once a legislature was found to be malapportioned.93 
Although this issue predates Baker,94 two contrasting answers to this
problem are tucked within the case’s many concurrences and dissents.
In a footnote appended to the last sentence of his concurrence, Justice
Douglas opined—without analysis—that it is “plainly correct” that “a 
legislature, though elected under an unfair apportionment scheme, is 
nonetheless a legislature empowered to act.”95 Writing in dissent,
89. Martin v. Henderson, 289 F. Supp. 411, 414 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) (holding, with little 
discussion, that “[t]here is no[] merit to the petitioner’s argument concerning the pertinent 
statute’s having been enacted by a malapportioned legislature” as that legislature was a legislature 
“empowered to act” (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 250 n.5 (Douglas, J., concurring)).
90. Huber v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 437, 438–43 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
1967). 
91. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Thomson, 251 F. Supp. 450, 453 (D. Wyo. 1965) (“No inference is to 
be drawn that the laws enacted by the 38th Wyoming State Legislature are invalid by reason of
our finding that the representation in the state Senate constitutes an invidious discrimination.”),
aff’d sub nom. Harrison v. Schaefer, 383 U.S. 269 (1966); Huber, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d at 442–43 (“If
there were no other reason to support the validity of the acts of the legislature, the de facto
doctrine which has been ingrafted upon our law would be sufficient.”); see also Beiser, supra note 
88, at 563 (“Without exception, both state and federal courts refused to reverse criminal
convictions based on statutes adopted by malapportioned legislatures before their apportionment 
was contested . . . .”).
92. Ryan v. Tinsley, 316 F.2d 430, 432 (10th Cir. 1963). In Ryan, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit went on to provide a dramatic prognostication of what would result in the 
event the court failed to apply the de facto doctrine:
An acceptance of the contentions of the petitioner would produce chaos. A presently
unascertainable number of Colorado statutes would be nullified. Property rights would 
be jeopardized. The marital status of many individuals would be questionable. Tax 
statutes would be unenforceable. The prison gates would be thrown open. The 
maintenance of law and order would be imperilled. Government would exist in name
only. A recognition of the consequences compels rejection of the arguments.
Id.
 93. Beiser, supra note 88, at 564.
 94. See, e.g., Kidd v. McCanless, 292 S.W.2d 40, 44 (Tenn. 1956) (refusing to find a 
reapportionment act unconstitutional as the result “would be to deprive us of the present 
Legislature and the means of electing a new one and ultimately bring about the destruction of the
State itself” since the de facto doctrine would offer no shield to future actions).
95. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 250 n.5 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing City of Cedar
Rapids v. Cox, 108 N.W.2d 253, 262–63 (Iowa 1961)). Interestingly, the case cited by Justice
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2020] A CLOUD OF CONSTITUTIONAL ILLEGITIMACY 973
Justice Frankfurter took a more alarmist approach, noting that “it
cannot be doubted that the striking down” of a state’s reapportionment 
statute “would deprive the State of all valid apportionment legislation 
and . . . deprive the State of an effective law-based legislative
branch.”96 Although perhaps not explicit, these competing perspectives 
are really debates about de facto legislative authority.  
At first, many courts embraced Justice Douglas’s position,97 
primarily by expanding de facto principles to apply prospectively in
various creative ways. Several of them, including the Supreme Court, 
noted that state legislatures are the body tasked with
reapportionment98—a directive that often comes straight from the state 
constitution itself99—and therefore legislatures must at least be allowed
to reapportion themselves.100 At its base, this is essentially an argument
of bald necessity; if the state legislature cannot reapportion itself, “the 
State [as a whole] would be helpless to accomplish the
Douglas does not support his proposition. In Cedar Rapids, the Iowa Supreme Court actually
rejected an argument that the Iowa legislature was unconstitutionally malapportioned. Cedar
Rapids, 108 N.W.2d at 262–263. As a result, “its decision does not reflect on the powers of an
unconstitutionally apportioned body.” Beiser, supra note 88, at 555 n.12. 
96. Baker, 369 U.S. at 329–30 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
97. See, e.g., Martin v. Henderson, 289 F. Supp. 411, 414 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) (citing Baker, 369
U.S. at 250 n.5 (Douglas, J., concurring)); Mann v. Davis, 238 F. Supp. 458, 459 (E.D. Va. 1964)
(same), aff’d sub nom. Hughes v. WMCA, Inc., 379 U.S. 694 (1965). 
98. See, e.g., Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 676 (1964) (allowing 
the Maryland legislature an opportunity to reapportion itself following a finding of
malapportionment “since [the] primary responsibility for legislative apportionment rests with the 
legislature itself”). 
99. Cedar Rapids, 108 N.W.2d at 263 (noting—prior to Baker—that “[t]he Iowa Constitution
specifically places the responsibility of reapportionment of the Legislature upon the Legislature 
itself, and provides methods for implementing that function . . . [and i]t is not for the courts to say 
that constitutional procedures do not protect the citizens”).
 100. Tawes, 377 U.S. at 675–76 (“[T]he Maryland Legislature presumably has the inherent 
power to enact at least temporary reapportionment legislation pending adoption of state 
constitutional provisions relating to legislative apportionment which comport with federal
constitutional requirements.” (emphasis added)); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964)
(holding that an Alabama district court “correctly recognized that legislative reapportionment is
primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, and that judicial relief becomes
appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional
requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so”); Toombs v.
Fortson, 241 F. Supp. 65, 71 (N.D. Ga. 1965) (accepting “the proposed House plan of 
apportionment and the current Senate plan of apportionment as interim plans to be used on stated
conditions and until proper apportionment becomes a fact”), aff’d, 384 U.S. 210 (1966); Mann, 
238 F. Supp. at 459 (“We think the 1963 Assembly necessarily is empowered to enact the requisite 
reapportionment laws. There is no other body to do so, and unless its jurisdiction is recognized
for this purpose the State would be helpless to accomplish the reapportionment.”).
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reapportionment” because “[t]here is no other body to do so.”101 
Although this approach may have avoided invoking the de facto 
doctrine by name, it did conjure up its attendant specter of necessity to 
effectively bestow de facto status on illegal legislatures.  
A few state and lower federal courts, having been given an inch, 
took a mile, and proceeded to hold that the Supreme Court, “[b]y 
repeatedly encouraging invalidly apportioned state legislatures to 
reapportion themselves . . . ha[d] clearly recognized that until a new 
legislature is elected, the existing legislature may validly legislate.”102 
Commentators103 and critics104 soon followed suit. Several courts,
however, were even less circumspect in prospectively extending a
traditionally retrospectively oriented doctrine to affirm such shadow 
legislatures’ plenary authority. These courts found the need to
maintain the “governmental order” guaranteed by the de facto officer 
doctrine “is even more imperative when the spectre proposed is a
government without legislative power.”105 None of these courts 
attempted to reconcile bestowing de facto status on an illegal 
legislature with the traditional rule that when color of authority is lost,
so is de facto authority.106 
101. Mann, 238 F. Supp. at 459. 
102. Silver v. Brown, 405 P.2d 132, 140 (Cal. 1965); see also People ex rel. Engle v. Kerner, 
205 N.E.2d 33, 39–41 (Ill. 1965) (holding the de facto legislature had “full power to act” going
forward).
 103. See, e.g., Beiser, supra note 88, at 577 (opining that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Fortson confirmed that “a legislature, is a legislature, is a legislature”).
104. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 245 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (railing against the
Court’s decision to allow a malapportioned legislature to select a governor as a “perpetuat[ion
of] electoral vices” but conceding that the Court has “declined to deprive a malapportioned
legislature of its de facto status as a legislature”).
105. Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 723 (N.J. 1964); see also Engle, 205 N.E.2d at 39–40
(expressly employing the de facto doctrine to permit the unconstitutional Illinois Senate to
redistrict via constitutional amendment); Scholle v. Hare, 116 N.W.2d 350, 356–57 (Mich. 1962)
(twisting several precedents to create a “general rule that where the law creating a public office
is declared void the acts of an officer continuing to function thereunder will, until he is legally
succeeded, be upheld as the acts of a de facto officer” (emphasis added)); cf. Davis v. Synhorst,
217 F. Supp. 492, 505 (S.D. Iowa 1963) (finding malapportionment but withholding a judicial
remedy, noting that “[i]nasmuch as a legislative branch of state government is absolutely essential
to carry out and operate state government, including any obligation which may exist with respect 
to apportionment, nothing should be done at this time which carries any reflection upon the
legality of the legislative branch of government”), aff’d sub nom. Hill v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565 
(1964). 
106. See, e.g., Sincock v. Gately, 262 F. Supp. 739, 851 (D. Del. 1967); Jonas v. Hearnes, 236
F. Supp. 699, 708 (W.D. Mo. 1964); League of Neb. Municipalities v. Marsh, 232 F. Supp. 411, 414 
(D. Neb. 1964); Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183, 190 (D.N.D. 1964).  
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However, many judges were uncomfortable with this prospective
expansion. Some, still concerned about the problems raised by Justice
Frankfurter in Baker, avoided the scope-of-authority issue entirely by
choosing to find malapportioned legislatures “prospectively null and 
void” and merely proscribed the use of malapportioned districts in
future elections.107 Others attempted to straddle the line by permitting
de facto legislative operation subject to certain restrictions.108 For 
example, a handful of courts permitted the resumption of full
legislative powers after passing reapportionment legislation,109 while 
others only permitted legislatures to reapportion themselves.110 To add
to the confusion, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed such
restrictions on three separate occasions, implying these legislatures did
not have full power to act.111 
At base, these deep divides in opinion reflect a fundamental
discomfort with allowing illegal legislatures to continue legislating. But
as those courts that tried to straddle the line between permitting full 
power to act and creating a legislative vacuum demonstrate, de facto
authority is not an all-or-nothing proposition. In fact, courts have 
crafted many limits on the doctrine over the years that could—and
107. Davis v. Synhorst, 225 F. Supp. 689, 694 (S.D. Iowa 1964) (emphasis added), aff’d sub 
nom. Hill v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565 (1964); see also Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316, 318 (S.D. Fla. 
1962) (“We conclude that the constitutional and statutory provisions of the State of Florida, which
provide for the apportionment and reapportionment, are null, void and prospectively 
inoperative.”).
 108. Scholle, 116 N.W.2d at 356 (imposing a time limit on the de facto operation of the 
Michigan legislature). 
109. See, e.g., Long v. Avery, 251 F. Supp. 541, 558 (D. Kan. 1965) (“We further hold and 
direct that after the Kansas legislature has enacted a constitutionally valid Senatorial
reapportionment statute, and not before then, . . . the Senate should not be restrained from 
considering and passing such legislation as it considers to be in the public interest.” (emphasis 
added)). 
110. Butterworth v. Dempsey, 237 F. Supp. 302, 310–13 (D. Conn. 1964) (enjoining the 
General Assembly of the State of Connecticut “from doing any act or taking any steps in
furtherance of [its] legislative functions” following a malapportionment finding; this “restraint on
the carrying on of the legislative functions of the General Assembly” was later stayed so long as
the legislature adhered to a set of directives that would result in reapportionment).
 111. See generally Mann v. Davis, 238 F. Supp. 458, 459 (E.D. Va. 1964) (stating that the
“[General] Assembly necessarily is empowered to enact the requisite reapportionment laws” 
because “[t]he Supreme Court has tacitly approved such accordance of provisional vitality to the
existing legislature”), aff’d sub nom. Hughes v. WMCA, Inc., 379 U.S. 694 (1965); Buckley v.
Hoff, 234 F. Supp. 191, 198 (D. Vt. 1964) (holding that the court is not “restrain[ed] . . . from
ordering that the Vermont General Assembly be reapportioned” and that “the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution is being violated by the present
apportionment” scheme), modified sub nom. Parsons v. Buckley, 379 U.S. 359 (1965). 
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should—be used to police shadow legislatures even if they are allowed
to continue governing. The next Part focuses on these limitations. 
II. PROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECTIVE LIMITS ON THE DE FACTO 
DOCTRINE
At first glance, the de facto doctrine seems categorical—the acts 
of a de facto officer are as binding as those of a de jure officer.112 But
on closer view, this principle is riddled with exceptions, exemptions,
and limits. Although most of these limits were ignored or overlooked
by many of the reapportionment-era courts described in Part I, they 
may have provided answers to the tricky scope-of-authority question 
that so many of them struggled with. This Part describes the formal and 
functional doctrinal parameters that might help a court craft a
satisfactory remedy when faced with a dispute over a gerrymandered 
legislature’s legal latitude.
Section A starts by describing structural and constitutional limits 
on the de facto doctrine. Although these limits are primarily
retrospective, there is no reason to believe they would not apply 
prospectively as well. Section B continues by describing various 
doctrinal limitations, which can be traced back to antiquity. Courts 
have prohibited retrospective application of the doctrine when it might 
be used to take advantage of the public; some have gone even further 
and denied de facto protection to actions not deemed “necessary and
proper.” But when considering prospective actions, courts are often 
caught peeking behind the curtain to consider an act’s legal vehicle, the
involvement of the illegal body, and the nature of the act when
determining whether validation is proper.  
A. Structural Limits and the Constitutional-Rights Exception 
At the same time lower courts were unevenly expanding the de 
facto doctrine—or something like it—to prospectively validate certain 
future acts of malapportioned legislatures, the Supreme Court was 
busy articulating structural and constitutional-rights-based limits on
112. For example, in Joseph v. Cawthorn, 74 Ala. 411 (1883), the Alabama Supreme Court 
stated that:
There is no distinction in law between the official acts of an officer de jure, and those 
of an officer de facto. So far as the public and third persons are concerned, the acts of
the one have precisely the same force and effect as the acts of the other. . . . Their
official acts are equally valid.
Id. at 415.
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2020] A CLOUD OF CONSTITUTIONAL ILLEGITIMACY 977
the doctrine. The first glimpse of such a contraction is found in the 
Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok.113 
Writing for a plurality, Justice Harlan declined to invoke the de facto
officer doctrine to validate the actions of non–Article III judges sitting
on Article III courts pursuant to federal statute.114 Although the 
doctrine would normally operate to bar private parties like the Glidden
petitioners from collaterally challenging judges’ constitutional 
authority for the first time on appeal,115 Justice Harlan parsed the 
Court’s previous case law to suggest several important constitutional 
limits on the doctrine’s application. Specifically, the doctrine would not
bar untimely challenges when the “alleged defect of authority operates 
also as a limitation on [the] Court’s appellate jurisdiction” or “when
the statute claimed to restrict authority is not merely technical but 
embodies a strong policy concerning the proper administration of 
judicial business”—especially “when the challenge is based upon 
nonfrivolous constitutional grounds.”116 In other words, the de facto
officer doctrine cannot frustrate the operation of the judicial system 
itself117 or interfere with “basic constitutional protections designed in
part for the benefit of litigants.”118 
Later Supreme Court decisions imposed additional constraints on
the doctrine. For example, in Ryder v. United States,119 the Court heard 
a challenge to an enlisted U.S. Coast Guardman’s court-martial 
conviction. But unlike the plaintiffs in Glidden, the Ryder petitioner 
also raised an Article II Appointments Clause challenge to members 
113. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
 114. Id. at 535–37. 
115. Id. at 535 (noting that this “rule is founded upon an obviously sound policy of preventing 
litigants from abiding the outcome of a lawsuit and then overturning it if adverse upon a 
technicality of which they were previously aware”).
 116. Id. at 535–36 (emphasis added). 
117. The De Facto Officer Doctrine, supra note 76, at 921; see also Nguyen v. United States,
539 U.S. 69, 79 (2003) (elaborating on the Glidden holding in rejecting the application of the de
facto officer doctrine to a prior decision of an illegally constituted court of appeals on the basis
that the circuit court had a “fundamental” defect of authority that violated a federal statute 
“embody[ing] weighty congressional policy concerning the proper organization of the federal
courts”); Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (declining to apply the de facto
officer doctrine when a strict application of the doctrine’s collateral bar would leave the plaintiffs
with only a “cumbersome” quo warranto remedy, “effectively bar[ring] their access to court”). 
118. Glidden, 370 U.S. at 536; see also Clokey, supra note 42, at 1136 (“The Constitution also 
places limits on the de facto officer doctrine. Particular provisions grant an individual a right to
require compliance with constitutional standards for perfect authority. Arguments from stability 
and efficiency cannot override these personal interests.” (footnote omitted)).
119. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
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of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review “before those very judges
and prior to their action on his case.”120 Although the Court of Military
Appeals agreed with the petitioner that the judges presiding over his 
trial had been unconstitutionally appointed, it “affirmed his conviction 
on the ground that the actions of these judges were valid de facto.”121 
The Supreme Court, however, refused to apply the de facto officer 
doctrine. In keeping with Glidden, the Court reasoned that the
petitioner had mounted a “timely challenge to the constitutional
validity” of the judges’ appointments rather than a mere statutory 
challenge.122 It further emphasized that enforcing “[a]ny other rule
would create a disincentive to raise Appointments Clause challenges
with respect to questionable judicial appointments.”123 
After expanding this limitation on the de facto doctrine, the Ryder
Court took pains to cabin this exception by distinguishing the 
petitioner’s constitutional challenge from those underlying its earlier 
decisions in Connor v. Williams124 and Buckley v. Valeo.125 In Connor, 
the Court declined to invalidate prior Mississippi legislative elections 
that it assumed were unconstitutional for the sake of argument,126 at 
least implying that the acts of a potentially illegal legislature “were not 
therefore void.”127 The Ryder Court found Connor distinguishable on 
the grounds that its earlier decision, “like other voting rights 
cases, . . . did not involve a defect in a specific officer’s title, but rather 
a challenge to the composition of an entire legislative body.”128 
Similarly, in Buckley, the Burger Court mechanically invoked vague de
facto principles to affirm the validity of the Federal Election 
Commission’s (“FEC”) past acts,129 thus preserving the challenged 
120. Id. at 182.
 121. Id. at 180.
 122. Id. at 182–83 (emphasis added). 
123. Id. at 183.
124. Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549 (1972).
125. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
126. Connor, 404 U.S. at 551–52. 
127. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183. 
128. Id. at 183 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
 129. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 142 (holding, somewhat perfunctorily, that “the [FEC’s] inability to
exercise certain powers because of the method by which its members have been selected should
not affect the validity of the Commission’s administrative actions and determinations to this
date,” and the “past acts of the Commission are therefore accorded de facto validity”).
Interestingly, the prior acts of the FEC were not challenged by the plaintiffs and remedies had
not been briefed by either party. Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for
Regulated Parties in Separation-of-Powers Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 530 (2014). Apparently,
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2020] A CLOUD OF CONSTITUTIONAL ILLEGITIMACY 979
actions of an entire administrative body. Given the vast differences in 
scope between the petitioner’s challenge to his court-martial 
conviction and the prior acts implicitly at stake in Connor and
Buckley—every act of the Mississippi legislature and FEC, 
respectively—the Ryder Court declined to extend whatever de facto 
principles the Connor and Buckley Courts “may be thought to have 
implicitly applied . . . beyond their facts.”130 Thus, while the Ryder
decision solidified a rough constitutional-rights exception to the de 
facto officer doctrine, it seemingly left open the possibility of applying 
de facto principles to larger-scale challenges where “the fear of the 
chaos that would result from the mass invalidation of a public officer’s 
past acts is at its apex.”131 
Read narrowly, each of these opinions only carves out small 
exceptions to the de facto officer doctrine in specific factual scenarios. 
“Collectively, however, they represent a gradual erosion of the 
doctrine,”132 especially in areas where its application would infringe on 
the ability of plaintiffs to bring constitutional claims. Although de facto
principles are still mechanically employed to protect past official
actions from “technical” defects,133 Glidden, Ryder, and others134 
suggest that the doctrine cannot be used to trump other substantive 
public interests. As the next Section will demonstrate, further 
functional limits support this understanding of the doctrine.
five Justices spontaneously created the Court’s de facto-esque remedy during a luncheon. Id. at 
530 n.272.
 130. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 184. 
131. Deepak Gupta, The Consumer Protection Bureau and the Constitution, 65 ADMIN. L.
REV. 945, 969–70 (2013) (opining that “[t]here is a significant difference between situations in
which the government is engaged in an ongoing action against a particular person”—a la Ryder— 
“and situations in which the government is establishing laws and regulations of general
applicability, carrying out investigation, or engaging in general supervision of an industry,” and
that the threat of “mass invalidation” of prior acts in the latter situation necessitates applying the
de facto officer doctrine).
 132. Clokey, supra note 42, at 1126. 
133. Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 77 (2003) (noting that courts still generally find
“actions to be valid de facto when there is a ‘merely technical’ defect of statutory authority”).
 134. See, e.g., United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 707 (2d Cir. 1962) (declining to apply 
the de facto doctrine as a collateral bar to an issue concerning the “separation of powers between 
the Executive and Legislative branches of our Government” as the case “raise[d] such important
constitutional issues that we believe the petitioner should not be foreclosed from asserting them
in this collateral proceeding”).
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B. Doctrinal Limits 
The de facto doctrine is not just limited by concerns about 
constitutional rights and judicial functionality. Over the years, judges 
have also developed various doctrinal limitations, largely by weighing 
the equities animating the doctrine’s application in the first place. This 
Section describes two important retrospective limitations on de facto 
validation before drawing on the limited universe of relevant case law 
to identify three additional prospective constraints.  
1. Retrospective Limits. At least two distinct lines of cases 
stretching back to before the Founding suggest that courts may reach 
back and invalidate the actions of de facto officers taken even before
they were unmasked. The first posits that the de facto doctrine may not 
be used at the public’s expense. The roots of this unremarkable 
proposition are found in English case law, which notes that while “all
judicial acts made by [a de facto officer], as admissions, institutions, 
certificates, and such like, shall be good,” they are not empowered to
engage in “such voluntary acts as tend to the depauperation of the[ir] 
successor[s].”135 In other words, the doctrine may be used to protect 
reliance on administrative acts, but it may not be employed to harm 
others.
American courts picked up and developed this thread, also 
reasoning that the doctrine, “having been invented to protect the
public, [should] not be applied where its application would result in
damage and injury to third persons.”136 Similarly, just as a de facto
officer may not act “against the public,” he also may not use his office 
for his own gain—otherwise the doctrine would allow officers to “take 
advantage of [their] own want of title.”137 Hence the traditional 
stipulation that the acts of a de facto officer are only “valid as to third
persons.”138 
The second line of cases draws a finer distinction: only “necessary
and proper” actions taken by a de facto officer are valid. This 
proposition can be traced as far back as the early sixteenth-century case 
135. O’Brian v. Knivan (1619) 79 Eng. Rep. 473, 475; Cro Jac. 552, 554.
 136. CONSTANTINEAU, supra note 20, § 309; see also Old Dominion Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v.
Sohn, 46 S.E. 222, 227 (W. Va. 1903) (noting that acts “in the interest of third parties or the public” 
will be sustained by the de facto doctrine, but acts “as against the public” are invalid); Green v.
Burke, 23 Wend. 490, 502 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840) (noting courts using the de facto doctrine “have 
stopped with preventing mischief to such as confide in officers who are acting without right”).
 137. Sohn, 46 S.E. at 227. 
138. Attorney Gen. v. Marston, 22 A. 560, 561 (N.H. 1891).
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Rex v. Lisle.139 There, the court noted, in an apparent dictum, that even
if a usurping mayor had been a de facto officer, he could not nominate 
another to the position of burgess because his act was “not necessary
for the preservation of the [borough].”140 In doing so, the court drew a
distinction between “such acts as are necessary for the good of the body, 
which comprehend judicial and ministerial acts, and such as are 
arbitrary and voluntary.”141 Because electing another burgess was not 
necessary in the eyes of the court, Lisle’s nomination would have been 
invalid regardless. 
The American judiciary adopted a similar “necessary and proper” 
restriction on the de facto doctrine in the wake of the Civil War. After 
the defeat of the Confederacy, both state and federal courts confronted
a monumental dilemma: What acts of rebellious state governments, if 
any, should be legally binding? On the one hand, mechanical 
application of de facto principles would validate the actions of
governments “established in hostility to the Constitution of the United 
States.”142 On the other hand, failing to apply some sort of de facto
principle would obviate every war-time governmental action in the 
Confederacy “and the rights that grew up under them during that
time[;] . . . a proposition so monstrous and mischievous in its
consequences as to shock the sense of justice of any reasonable and 
dispassionate mind.”143 
The Supreme Court attempted to thread this needle in a series of
Reconstruction-era decisions.144 First, the Court admitted that even 
though the secessionist governments could not be regarded as lawful,
they were “in the strictest sense of the words, a de facto 
139. R v. Lisle (1738) 95 Eng. Rep. 345; Andrews 163.
 140. Id. at 349.
 141. Id. (emphasis added). 
142. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 732 (1868), overruled in part by Morgan v. United States,
113 U.S. 476 (1885). 
143. Berry v. Bellows, 30 Ark. 198, 204 (1875).
 144. See, e.g., Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. 570, 580 (1873) (observing that no governmental
action could legitimize raising Confederate bonds for the purpose of waging war against the 
United States before turning to the “validity of judicial or legislative acts in the insurrectionary
States” governing various other subjects); Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. 1, 9 (1868) (“[T]he
Confederate government was never acknowledged by the United States as a de facto government 
in this sense. . . . But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a 
government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of
paramount force.”); White, 74 U.S. at 732–33 (observing that though the Texas legislature could 
not be regarded as lawful after the state had seceded, it was the state’s de facto government).
SCHEIDT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2019 4:52 PM       
   
  
 
  
   
   
   
    
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
   
   
  
  
 
  
 
  
   
  
    
 
982 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:959
government . . . to some extent.”145 Second, the Court held that the
nature of these de facto governments’ acts would determine their 
validity. Specifically: 
[A]cts necessary to peace and good order among citizens, such for 
example, as acts sanctioning and protecting marriage and the 
domestic relations, governing the course of descents, regulating the 
conveyance and transfer of property, real and personal, and providing
remedies for injuries to person and estate, and other similar acts, 
which would be valid if emanating from a lawful government, must be
regarded in general as valid when proceeding from an actual, though
unlawful government; and that acts in furtherance or support of
rebellion against the United States, or intended to defeat the just rights 
of citizens, and other acts of like nature, must, in general, be regarded 
as invalid and void.146 
The state supreme courts, with some initial exceptions,147 largely
followed suit.148 
In sum, the nature of a de facto officer’s or government’s acts may
determine their validity, even before they are unmasked or defeated.
Actions that either take advantage of one’s defective title or are not 
“necessary and proper” do not enjoy de facto protection. Presumably, 
these limits would also apply in the prospective realm, where the 
145. White, 74 U.S. at 732–33. In a separate decision released the same day, the Court 
described the distinguishing characteristics of such a de facto government—or “government of
paramount force”—as:  
(1), that its existence is maintained by active military power, within the territories, and 
against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that 
while it exists, it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by
acts of obedience, rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as 
wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful
government.
Thorington, 75 U.S. at 9.
 146. White, 74 U.S. at 733 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Reynes, 50 U.S. 127, 
153 (1850) (“[C]laims founded upon the acts of a government de facto must be sustained, if at all,
by the nature and character of such acts themselves, as proceeding from the exercise of the 
inherent and rightful powers of an independent government.” (emphasis added)). 
147. See, e.g., Penn v. Tollison, 26 Ark. 545, 579 (1871) (“Successful rebellions found new
governments; but the organizations, no matter by what name the rebellious party may call them,
which may have been used by a defeated rebellious organization, fall with their cause, and are
only evidence of what the government would have been if success had crowned their efforts.”),
overruled in part by Berry, 30 Ark. 198 (1875). 
148. See, e.g., Berry, 30 Ark. at 210–11 (quoting Thorington, 75 U.S. at 11–12); Scruggs v.
Luster, 48 Tenn. 150, 155 (1870) (noting that the opinion would follow the Supreme Court’s
decision in Thorington). 
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balance of equities favoring de facto validation would have shifted
substantially. 
2. Prospective Limits. Part I illustrated that courts have not 
hesitated to prospectively extend either the de facto doctrine itself or
its underlying policy rationales to allow shadow legislatures at least 
some power. But which powers courts permit such legislatures to 
maintain vary enormously—though not unpredictably. 
For example, in Toombs v. Fortson,149 a Georgia district court 
found the state legislature was malapportioned but allowed upcoming 
elections to take place.150 The prospective nature of this decision,
however, was put to the test when the legislature attempted to submit 
a new Constitution to voters, “which would have abolished the 
provisions for legislative selection of a Governor and have substituted 
a runoff or special election.”151 To forestall this outcome, the district
court issued a revised order that effectively held “that the Georgia
Legislature was so malapportioned that it could not properly submit to
the voters a new Constitution”152 until the “Assembly is reapportioned
in accordance with constitutional standards.”153 The Supreme Court 
heard a challenge to this restriction but declined to reach the merits 
because the situation might have become moot. Instead, the Court
vacated that part of the decree and remanded to the district court, to 
whom it expressly gave “a wide range in moulding a decree . . . for 
reconsideration of the desirability and need for the on-going injunction
in light of” the changed circumstances.154 Justice Harlan, concurring in
part, believed that this holding impliedly “furnish[ed] a strong 
practical, if not legal, precedent for other district courts” to limit illegal
legislatures’ powers.155 
149. Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated in part, 379 U.S. 621 (1965)
(per curiam), amended, 380 U.S. 929 (1965). 
150. Toombs v. Fortson, Civ. A. No. 7883 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 1964) (final revised order).
151. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 245 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
 152. Id. (emphasis added) (describing the revised order issued by the district court in Toombs, 
Civ. A. No. 7883 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 1964)). The district court also limited the new legislature to
“to the enactment of such legislation as shall properly come before the said Legislature during
the regular 1965 45-day session.” Toombs, Civ. A. No. 7883 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 1964).
 153. Toombs, 379 U.S. at 621 (quoting Toombs, Civ. A. No. 7883 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 1964)).
 154. Id. at 622.
 155. Id. at 626 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). At least in Justice 
Harlan’s opinion, “it seems scarcely open to serious doubt that so long as the federal courts allow
this Georgia Legislature to sit, it must be regarded as the de facto legislature of the State,
possessing the full panoply of legislative powers accorded by Georgia law.” Id.
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At least one federal district judge took up this mantle shortly 
thereafter. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker, the Utah
legislature adopted a resolution calling for a federal constitutional 
convention to preserve malapportioned state districts.156 Four years 
later, Chief District Judge Ritter explicitly held that the 
malapportioned legislature lacked the power to “adopt a valid 
Resolution applying to Congress to call an Article V convention for the 
purpose of continuing its own unconstitutional existence.”157 In his 
analysis, he reasoned that “state legislature[s] participat[ing] in the 
amending process” must satisfy the requirements of the U.S.
Constitution, which “demand[s] that [a] legislature accurately reflect 
the only majority by which our system permits impairment of such
rights”—one person, one vote.158 Judge Ritter also drew a clear 
distinction between “ordinary, customary legislation needed to keep a
state government going” that “has been held valid though the
legislature is unconstitutionally apportioned” and the Utah 
“legislators’ attempt to continue themselves in their illegal state of 
unconstitutional apportionment.”159 In short, while “practicalities”
supported validating the former, no such “practical problem”
counseled against voiding such a blatant power grab.160 
Toombs and Judge Ritter’s opinion offer two important lessons. 
First, the type of legislation passed by the de facto body mattered.
Although “ordinary legislation” did not raise concerns, proposals to 
amend the constitution did. Second, judges who “felt that a legislature 
based on an unconstitutional apportionment is not a fully valid
legislature”161 were uneasy with permitting the same legislature to 
“directly perpetuate or allow the continuance of its unrepresentative 
condition”162 by modifying either the state or federal constitution.
However, courts were more comfortable with malapportioned 
156. Petuskey v. Rampton, 307 F. Supp. 231, 233 (D. Utah 1969) (Christensen, J., concurring),
aff’d, 431 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1970).
157. Petuskey v. Rampton, 307 F. Supp. 235, 249–51 (D. Utah 1969), rev’d, 431 F.2d 378 (10th 
Cir. 1970). 
158. Id. (quoting Peter H. Wolf, An Antireapportionment Amendment: Can It Be Legally
Ratified?, 52 A.B.A. J. 326, 329 (1966)). 
159. Id. at 253–54. 
160. Id. The Tenth Circuit reversed on jurisdictional grounds and expressly refrained from
addressing the merits. Petuskey, 431 F.2d at 383.
 161. Beiser, supra note 88, at 576.
162. Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Dirksen Amendment and the Article V Convention Process, 66
MICH. L. REV. 949, 974 (1967) (emphasis added).
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legislatures triggering an amendment process.163 Indeed, even the 
district court in Toombs still permitted the Georgia legislature to call a 
constitutional convention—it merely forbade the legislature from 
submitting its own proposal.164 Thus, while the nature of the act and its 
legal vehicle are important, so is the illegal body’s level of involvement 
in the process. 
III. THE GERRYMANDERING CONTEXT
This Part explores whether the principles and trends identified in 
Parts I and II support upholding or discarding the actions of 
gerrymandered legislatures. A gerrymander is the “deliberate and
arbitrary distortion of district boundaries and populations for partisan 
or personal political purposes.”165 In more mathematical terms, a
gerrymander is an intentionally crafted “district plan that results in one 
party wasting many more votes than its adversary.”166 
By and large, gerrymandering comes in two distinct flavors: racial 
and partisan. Racial gerrymanders usually either (1) dilute minority 
voting power by packing and cracking racial groups,167 or (2) “segregate 
citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without 
sufficient justification.”168 Numerous unconstitutional racial 
gerrymanders have already been identified and struck down.169 
Political—or partisan—gerrymandering, on the other hand, packs and
163. See, e.g., West v. Carr, 370 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tenn. 1963) (noting that a constitutional
convention, unlike a legislature “has no power to take any final action, but can only propose 
constitutional changes for ratification or rejection by the people”). But see State ex rel. Smith v.
Gore, 143 S.E.2d 791, 795 (W. Va. 1965) (relying on a provision of the West Virginia Constitution 
to reject a constitutional convention that drew members from malapportioned districts). 
164. Toombs v. Fortson, Civ. A. No. 7883 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 1964) (final revised order).
165. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring). Numerous other
definitions have been proposed, “but they all boil down to the idea that gerrymandering is the 
intentional manipulation of districting lines for political advantage.” Bernard Grofman, Criteria
for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 100 n.94 (1985).
166. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the
Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 849–50 (2015). 
167. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (finding that an Alabama 
legislative act redefining the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee “deprive[d] the Negro petitioners
discriminatorily of the benefits of residence in Tuskegee, including, inter alia, the right to vote in
municipal elections”).
168. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 652, 657 (1993) (“Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial
purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from
the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.”).
 169. See supra notes 167–168 and accompanying text.
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cracks potential voters on the basis of party affiliation.170 And though
some state courts have held that partisan gerrymandering is 
unconstitutional under their state constitutions,171 the Supreme Court 
decided in Rucho v. Common Cause that such “claims present political 
questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”172 But even if this 
justiciability distinction between racial and partisan gerrymandering 
proves to be the rule in the majority of states, its practical effect may 
be dulled. Because racial groups, especially minorities, remain 
politically polarized,173 state legislative maps vulnerable to partisan-
gerrymandering challenges may also be vulnerable to racial challenges,
and vice versa.174 
A. Validity of Actions Taken Before and After an Adverse 
Gerrymandering Decision
Although this Note is primarily concerned with the prospective 
actions of gerrymandered legislatures, Subsection 1 explores the 
equitable calculus involved in applying the de facto doctrine
retrospectively to protect actions taken before an adverse court 
decision. This provides a contrast to prospective application of the
doctrine and helps to identify issues that will remain troublesome in
the prospective realm. These issues are examined in Subsection 2. To
be sure, while the constitutional deficiencies in a gerrymandered 
legislature may give one pause, the overwhelming weight of authority 
suggests that prior acts must be validated. But after an adverse 
170. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923–24 (2018).
 171. See Common Cause v. Lewis, 18 CVS 14001, slip op. at 10 (Wake Cty. Super. Ct. Sept. 3,
2019) (holding partisan gerrymandering to be unconstitutional under the North Carolina 
Constitution); League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 175 A.3d 282, 284 (Pa. 2018)
(holding partisan gerrymandering to be unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution).
 172. Id. at 2506–07. 
173. N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 225 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[I]n
North Carolina, African-American race is a better predictor for voting Democratic than party
registration.” (citation and quotations omitted)); Trends in Party Affiliation Among Demographic
Groups, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 20, 2018), http://www.people-press.org/2018/03/20/1-trends-in-
party-affiliation-among-demographic-groups [https://perma.cc/AT48-3UKW] (noting that
“African American voters remain overwhelmingly Democratic” as “84% identify with or lean
toward the Democratic Party,” while “[j]ust 8% of black voters identify in some way with the
Republican Party”).
 174. Cf.  JOHNATHAN WINBURN, THE REALITIES OF REDISTRICTING: FOLLOWING THE
RULES AND LIMITING GERRYMANDERING IN STATE LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING 19 (2008)
(noting that “[i]n states with large minority populations, a Republican partisan gerrymander may
resemble a racial gerrymander without necessarily focusing” on creating “packed” minority 
districts). 
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2020] A CLOUD OF CONSTITUTIONAL ILLEGITIMACY 987
decision, the equities shift, and courts should be more hesitant to give 
illegal legislatures blanket authority. At this stage, courts should 
consider the challenged acts themselves and subject attempts to 
permanently entrench power to special opprobrium.
1. Validity of Retrospective Actions. Several considerations 
counsel against applying the de facto doctrine even to legislative 
actions taken before an unconstitutional legislature was deemed 
unconstitutional. First, any alleged defect in the legislature’s authority
would be more than “merely technical”—the threshold proposed by 
the Glidden Court.175 Rather, gerrymanders are deliberately crafted to 
either expand or entrench a party’s power,176 often through the use of 
highly sophisticated mapmaking technology paired with demographic 
and personal data skimmed from public records or purchased from 
private websites.177 Indeed, some gerrymanders are so sturdily
constructed and “so complete” that even their “master designers”
cannot pull them back or control their extremes.178 Therefore, 
gerrymanders may arguably trespass on the requirement that illegal
officers come to possess their offices in “good faith.”179 However, 
because legislatures are presumed to act in good faith,180 it seems 
unlikely that a court would find it lacking, absent exceptional 
circumstances.181 
175. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 535 (1962).
176. Michael E. Lewyn, How To Limit Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REV. 403, 407 (1993).
 177. DAVID DALEY, RAT F**KED: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE SECRET PLAN TO STEAL 
AMERICA’S DEMOCRACY xxv, 51, 56–58 (2016) (“[T]he [demographic and personal] data and the 
[mapmaking] technology make [gerrymandering] almost as easy as one-click ordering on
Amazon. It has made rewiring our democracy as simple as outbidding a rival on eBay, with the 
additional similarity that the side with the most money wins the prize.”).
 178. DALEY, supra note 177, at 96–97 (noting that extreme gerrymandering created districts
that were so protected that “members felt no need to moderate their views,” so compromises that
may have pushed policies or redistricting forward became more and more difficult to achieve).
 179. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
 180. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (noting that in the context of a racial-
gerrymandering challenge, “until a claimant makes a showing sufficient to support that allegation
the good faith of a state legislature must be presumed”); Johnson v. U.S. Food Serv., 427 P.3d
996, 1002 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018) (“We presume statutes are constitutional and resolve all doubts
in favor of a statute’s validity. We interpret a statute in a way that makes it constitutional if there
is any reasonable construction that would maintain the Legislature’s apparent intent.”).
181. This is probably even true for racial gerrymanders, as many racially gerrymandered
legislatures assert their districts were drawn in a racially biased manner because of the
requirements of the Voting Rights Act. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 326 F.
Supp. 3d 128, 143 (E.D. Va. 2018) (noting that defendants “asserted that compliance with Section
5 of the VRA, 52 U.S.C. § 10304, is a compelling state interest justifying the predominant use of
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Whether gerrymandering tramples on “basic constitutional
protections designed in part for the benefit of litigants”182 or frustrates 
the operation of the judicial system itself183 is also a more difficult 
question than it first appears. Gerrymandered legislatures may run 
afoul of the Elections Clause, the First and Fourteenth Amendments,184 
or state constitutional provisions.185 Any of these would facially 
amount to “nonfrivolous constitutional” claims that Glidden suggests
should be carefully assessed before the application of common law
savings doctrines like the de facto officer doctrine. Yet even though 
these constitutional protections are “designed in part for the benefit of 
litigants” in the broad sense that many constitutional provisions are,
they may not be perfectly analogous to those at issue in the Glidden
line of cases. Specifically, Glidden, Ryder, and others186 all considered 
collateral attacks to the authority of administrators or judges appointed 
in violation of the Appointments Clause. While the Appointments 
Clause is substantively neither more nor less important than other 
constitutional provisions, it is designed in part to ensure that parties 
before an Article III court receive judgment at the hands of confirmed
judges.187 In other words, such litigants are directly protected from de 
facto authorities by the Constitution in a way that gerrymandered 
litigants may not be. 
Furthermore, the overwhelming weight of authority suggests that 
the past acts of illegally constituted legislatures are valid.188 And even 
when courts were busy converting the de facto officer doctrine into
race in the 2011 [Virginia state legislative redistricting] plan”), appeal dismissed, 139 S. Ct. 1945
(2019); Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 804 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (noting that
defendants “[c]laim[ed] (incorrectly) that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act required the creation
of majority-black districts ‘where possible’”), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
182. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 536 (1962).
 183. The De Facto Officer Doctrine, supra note 76, at 921; see also Nguyen v. United States,
539 U.S. 69, 79 (2003).
 184. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 941. 
185. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has held that gerrymandering violates the Constitution of Pennsylvania).
 186. See, e.g., Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (addressing an
Appointments Clause challenge “that neither official ha[d] been appointed by the President or
confirmed by the Senate”); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1962) (concerning
an Appointments Clause challenge that the federal judge who had presided over the petitioner’s 
criminal trial had not been appointed pursuant to the Clause).
 187. See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 536 (finding that judges who had not been appointed pursuant 
to the requirements of the Appointments Clause were saddled with a “defect of authority” that
“relates to basic constitutional protections designed in part for the benefit of litigants”).
 188. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
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2020] A CLOUD OF CONSTITUTIONAL ILLEGITIMACY 989
legal swiss cheese, the Supreme Court made it clear that retrospectively
oriented collateral challenges to the composition of legal bodies as a 
whole were unavailing.189 Indeed, preventing the chaos that would 
result from the widespread invalidation of acts that individuals 
reasonably relied on is the de facto officer doctrine’s raison d’etre.190 
Whether more specific challenges to past acts may nonetheless evade 
automatic validation still remains an open question, because “[e]ven at 
common law the de facto doctrine yielded when there were policies 
involved which outweighed public inconvenience and the frustration of 
legitimate reliance which are the foundation of the doctrine.”191 It 
seems clear, however, that truly exceptional circumstances would have
to arise for such an act to merit retrospective invalidation. 
2. Validity of Prospective Actions. After a state legislature is found 
to be unconstitutionally racially or politically gerrymandered, the 
equities shift significantly. For the following reasons, courts should 
resist a blanket and mechanical invocation of the de facto doctrine or
its animating principles to protect prospective actions. First, the “color 
of authority” that invests a de facto officer with power equivalent to
that of a de jure officer has entirely evaporated. At that point, the
offending officer—or legislature—technically becomes a usurper, 
whose acts are wholly void.192 Although such an officer may sometimes 
be allowed to remain in her position if the defect in her authority is 
exceedingly trivial,193 a gerrymandered legislature’s unconstitutionality
is perhaps the furthest thing from trivial. Moreover, as described 
above, a gerrymandered legislature’s defect is the product of deliberate 
action undertaken for political gain, not a simple well-intentioned 
mistake; “good faith” is at best debatable. Whether the citizens of a
189. See supra notes 124–131 and accompanying text.
 190. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
191. Pannam, supra note 69, at 58–59. 
192. See People ex rel. Duncan v. Beach, 242 S.E.2d 796, 801 (N.C. 1978) (“A usurper in office 
is distinguished from a de facto officer in that a usurper takes possession of office and undertakes
to act officially without any authority, either actual or apparent. Since he is not an officer at all or
for any purpose, his acts are absolutely void . . . .”).
 193. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 268 F.2d 623, 624–27 (9th Cir. 1959) (employing the de 
facto officer doctrine to affirm the ruling of a trial judge even though the challenger—and the
judge himself—knew the judge’s title was defective from the start because the judge started
working one day before his tenure officially commenced with the acquiescence of the challenger);
see also The De Facto Officer Doctrine, supra note 76, at 913 (“Although the [Leary] court’s
opinion is not phrased in terms of the elements of reputation, its decision leads to the conclusion
that a known defect may be so insubstantial as not to undermine acquiescence in a claim of
authority.”).
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990 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:959
state may nevertheless acquiesce to the continued exercise of power by 
such an illegal legislature—thereby transforming it back into a de facto 
legislature—is a more difficult, fact-specific inquiry. If current 
gerrymandering actions are any clue, acquiescence may be the last 
thing in the minds of many plaintiffs.194 
Second, gerrymandering may also transform the legislature into a 
usurper under the applicable state constitution. For example, a North 
Carolina superior court refused to bestow blanket de facto status on its 
racially gerrymandered legislature195 because Article I, § 3 of the North 
Carolina Constitution provides that the “people of this State have the
inherent, sole, and exclusive right of regulating the internal 
government . . . and of altering or abolishing their Constitution and
form of government.”196 Because the legislature did not represent “the
people,” it could not act to amend the constitution.197 Although de 
facto principles and notions of necessity may extend to judicial gray
areas, they cannot be used to defeat clear constitutional mandates.198 
Third, even if a court finds that a gerrymandered legislature’s
prospective actions evade the de facto doctrine’s many limitations and 
escape the clutches of state constitutional law, the doctrine’s 
foundational principles demand searching judicial scrutiny. As 
described in Part I, the de facto doctrine is entirely a creature of public 
policy animated primarily by interrelated concerns of necessity and
reliance. Necessity-based interests are significantly diminished after an
illegal officer is found to be such because no widespread invalidation 
of past acts is implicated—only those postdating an adverse court 
decision are at risk. Any attendant concerns of chaos are reduced if 
fewer laws are at stake. 
194. See, e.g., Covington v. North Carolina, 270 F. Supp. 3d 881, 901 (M.D.N.C.) (discussing 
plaintiffs’ request for a special election in part because “the Supreme Court’s summary affirmance
of [a racial gerrymandering finding] calls into question, as a matter of state law, the authority of
legislators elected in unconstitutional districts to legislate”), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017); 
Petitioners’ Opening Brief at 74, League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 
737 (Pa. 2018) (No. 159 MM 2017), 2018 WL 722927, at *74 (asking the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court to give the legislature “two weeks to enact a map using non-partisan criteria” and enjoin
the use of the alleged politically gerrymandered maps in elections taking place within the year).
195. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. Moore, No. 18 CVS 9806, slip op. at 12 (Wake
Cty. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2019). 
196. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 3 (emphasis added). 
197. Moore, slip op. at 12.
 198. See Gene B. Penland, The De Jure—De Facto Controversy and Its Effect upon Legal
Rights, 1 WASHBURN L.J. 245, 255 (1961) (“Society would not be demanding too much of its
system of jurisprudence to ask that system to follow its own rules.”). 
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2020] A CLOUD OF CONSTITUTIONAL ILLEGITIMACY 991
This common-sense proposition finds support in the 
reapportionment-era decisions. When Baker was decided, many 
malapportioned legislatures had been operating unconstitutionally for 
over half a century,199 meaning any failure to apply the de facto 
doctrine retrospectively would wipe out decades’ worth of laws, 
appointments, and adjudications; the need for the doctrine was 
paramount. In contrast, the need for prospective operation of said
legislatures was hotly debated,200 so much so that some courts denied 
illegal legislatures any power at all, aside from the ability to
reapportion.201 If illegal governments can be limited in one highly
analogous context without disaster, it may be proper to limit them in
this one as well.
Fourth, the need to closely examine the actions of gerrymandered
legislatures increases after a finding of unconstitutionality. Indeed, at
least theoretically, if an illegal legislature could continue to act without 
limitation, it could cure its own unconstitutional defect by simply
making it constitutional. Although a state legislature certainly could
not amend the federal Constitution on its own, future partisan 
gerrymandering decisions, in particular, may hinge on aspects of state
constitutions subject to such modification.202 If this scenario seems far-
fetched, consider that over thirty state legislatures supported a 
resolution to amend the U.S. Constitution following Baker v. Carr to 
effectively override that opinion and preserve their power to draw 
malapportioned districts.203 
199. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187 (1962) (addressing a 1901 Tennessee districting
statute); Kidd v. McCanless, 292 S.W.2d 40, 44 (Tenn. 1956) (same).
 200. See supra Part I.C (discussing Baker’s approach to this problem).
 201. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. It is important to note that while the power
of illegal legislatures is hotly debated, plaintiffs’ standing to challenge legislative actions usually
is not. See, e.g., Moore, slip op. at 7–8 (noting that the illegally gerrymandered legislative 
defendants did not even bother to challenge the standing of the lead plaintiff—the NAACP—to
bring suit to invalidate proposed constitutional amendments under state law); see also supra Part 
II.B (cataloging multiple cases where plaintiffs were explicitly or implicitly found to have standing
to bring challenges to prospective legislative actions).
 202. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 814 (Pa. 2018)
(relying on the “Free and Equal Elections Clause” in the Pennsylvania Constitution as the basis
for its partisan gerrymander decision). 
203. Chris Schmidt, The Forgotten Backlash Against the Warren Court, IIT CHICAGO-KENT 
C. L.: SCOTUS NOW (Dec. 30, 2014), http://blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/iscotus/forgotten-backlash-
warren-court [https://perma.cc/CC8H-KGBH] (noting that thirty-two of the required thirty-four
states approved resolutions calling for a constitutional convention on an anti-reapportionment
amendment that would have allowed “factors other than population” to be considered in at least 
one house of a bicameral state legislature); see also Wolf, supra note 158, at 327 (“These proposed
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992 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:959
Even if an unconstitutionally gerrymandered legislature does not 
take steps to transform itself into a legal legislature, endless 
opportunities for mischief and power fixing abound. For a prime 
example, look no further than the voter-ID amendment proposed by 
the 2018 North Carolina legislature. Two years earlier, the same
racially gerrymandered legislature tried to pass a voter-ID requirement
that a federal court found “target[ed] African Americans with almost 
surgical precision,” largely because it excluded the use of IDs 
disproportionately held by African Americans.204 Because of the
structure of the voter-ID amendment,205 this illegal legislature would 
once again be responsible for determining which IDs qualified for use
at the polls. Only this time, it would have a state constitutional mandate 
behind it.
Undoubtedly, principles of necessity also counsel against throwing
a gerrymandered legislature out on the street. For one, the necessity of 
having the governmental body tasked with redistricting fix its 
underlying deficiencies remains just as compelling in the 
gerrymandering context as in the reapportionment context. Courts 
uniformly held that malapportioned legislatures maintained at least the 
ability to reapportion themselves;206 presumably gerrymandered 
legislatures are entitled to the same.207 In addition, if gerrymandered 
constitutional amendments would allow ‘the rotten boroughs to decide whether they should 
continue to be rotten.’” (citation omitted)).
204. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016).
 205. See infra note 225 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative mechanics of the 
North Carolina voter-ID amendment). 
206. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
 207. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 821–22 (noting in the context of a 
congressional gerrymander that “the initial and preferred path of legislative and executive
action . . . [would assign] primary responsibility and authority for drawing federal congressional
legislative districts . . . [to] the state legislature,” but reserving the judiciary’s power to create its
own districts). However, it should also be noted that even this power, which many
reapportionment-era courts considered foundational, has been tempered by the times. The
primary and urgent concern that compelled many reapportionment-era courts to continue to
allow malapportioned legislative action was the need to have the legislature reapportion itself— 
otherwise the legislature would be deprived of a “means of electing a new one and ultimately 
bring about the destruction of the State itself.” Kidd v. McCanless, 292 S.W.2d 40, 44 (Tenn. 1956).
Since the reapportionment era, courts have become much more comfortable with inserting 
themselves into the redistricting process, especially when it comes to hiring independent special
masters. See Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 384 (N.C. 2002) (“Indeed, within the context 
of state redistricting and reapportionment disputes, it is well within the ‘power of the judiciary of
a State to require valid reapportionment or to formulate a valid redistricting plan.’” (quoting Scott 
v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409 (1965) (per curiam))); Jensen v. Wis. Elections Bd., 639 N.W.2d
537, 542 (Wis. 2002) (noting the Supreme Court has held that federal courts will defer
consideration of redistricting disputes “where the State, through its legislative or judicial branch,
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2020] A CLOUD OF CONSTITUTIONAL ILLEGITIMACY 993
legislatures are prohibited from acting at all until new elections are
held, “a potentially dangerous interregnum could result, for there 
would be no legislature available in an emergency.”208 Layered on top 
of these considerations is the simple observation that not all 
gerrymanders are created equal—some are expansive enough to place
an entire legislature under a “cloud of constitutional illegitimacy,”209 
while others are minor and may only involve a wayward district or 
two.210 Therefore, the necessity of allowing continued legislative
activity may be a function of a gerrymander’s size, scope, and animus.  
Furthermore, although citizens’ reliance interests may be
attenuated after a finding of legislative unconstitutionality, they are not 
extinguished. If a legislature continues to act following an adverse
court decision, some citizens are guaranteed to take it at its word,
judicial judgment notwithstanding. While courts have often discounted 
these interests in the de facto doctrine’s traditional formulation,211 they 
are still a part of a court’s “remedial calculus,” which must “balance 
chaos, third-party interests, and the overall effectiveness of the remedy
with respect to the prevailing party, potential future parties, and the
political branches.”212 Although this “calculus” becomes more difficult 
after a legislature is found unconstitutional, the competing interests at 
stake demand that courts wrestle with them to the extent that they 
can.213 The next Section addresses the question of which postmortem 
has begun to address that highly political task itself” and “that any redistricting plan judicially
‘enacted’ by a state court (just like one enacted by a state legislature) would be entitled to
presumptive full-faith-and-credit legal effect in federal court”).
 208. Cf. Mann v. Davis, 238 F. Supp. 458, 459 (E.D. Va. 1964), aff’d sub nom. Hughes v.
WMCA, Inc., 379 U.S. 694 (1965) (discussing the reapportionment context).
209. Covington v. North Carolina, 270 F. Supp. 3d 881, 884 (M.D.N.C.), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 2211
(2017). 
210. Cf. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 635 (1993) (addressing a racial-gerrymandering challenge
to two congressional districts in North Carolina). 
211. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text (noting that because the de facto doctrine 
exists to safeguard the interests of those who reasonably relied on an official’s actions, the 
doctrine does not extend to situations in which one relies on the actions of those known to lack
the authority to make them).
 212. Barnett, supra note 125, at 534. 
213. This does not imply that such actions are nonjusticiable political questions. Baker holds
that:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found [1] a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning
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994 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:959
acts, if any, should evade a prospective application of the de facto 
doctrine or related principles of equity.
B. A Framework for Prospective Actions 
After a finding of unconstitutionality, the equities counseling 
applying or rejecting the de facto doctrine or similar savings principles 
have shifted. Therefore, courts should feel more comfortable “looking 
under the hood” and assessing the challenged acts themselves to
determine their validity. Drawing on historical lessons from Part II, this 
Note proposes approaching sticky problems of prospective validity by 
considering the interplay of three variables: (1) the legal vehicle,214 or 
how an act is proposed to be passed; (2) the level of involvement of the 
illegal governmental body;215 and (3) the nature of the act itself, or what 
it purports to do.216 Properly applied, this test should safeguard the
public from particularly egregious examples of legislative overreach 
while largely preserving a fully functioning government. The 
remainder of this Section describes this test in greater detail and
illustrates its hypothetical application. 
With respect to the first factor, as the permanency of the 
legislative act increases, so should judicial scrutiny.217 Even 
malapportioned legislatures were mostly allowed to pass ordinary
legislation; generally, courts only stepped in when constitutional
changes were implicated.218 This makes some intuitive sense, as
constitutional amendments, for example, are generally harder to undo
adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). While it is beyond the scope of this Note to give each of
these categories the attention they deserve, their power is likely limited in this context: courts are
constitutionally committed to judicial review of legislation; courts have hundreds of years of
doctrine and standards to draw upon; courts considering such challenges are hearing cases in
equity, not law; and the respect due to a coordinate branch of government is much diminished
after that branch of government is found to be illegal. 
214. See supra Part II.B.2 (describing how courts may differentiate between “ordinary”
legislation and constitutional amendments, for example).
 215. See supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text (describing a case in which the district
court permitted the illegal legislature to call a constitutional convention but forbade the
legislature from submitting its own constitutional amendments).
 216. See supra Part II.B (describing how courts treat with suspicion those legislative acts that 
injure third parties or preserve the maintenance of illegal power).
 217. See supra notes 152, 159 and accompanying text.
 218. See supra notes 152, 159 and accompanying text.
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2020] A CLOUD OF CONSTITUTIONAL ILLEGITIMACY 995
than ordinary majority-based enactments.219 If a court undoes a state 
legislative gerrymander, presumably a future, more representative
legislature could fix suspect acts passed only by a bare majority.
This logic may not survive closer scrutiny, however. Constitutional 
amendments often require ratification by popular referendum, 
whether they are proposed in a constitutional convention, by an act of 
the legislature, or via citizen initiative.220 Thus, some authorities submit 
that even proposals submitted by the most defective authorities can be
“cured” by the sovereign authority of the populace.221 Others disagree, 
noting “the mere right to approve or disapprove a proposed 
constitution does not afford to the general public a voice in the 
formulation thereof . . . [but is instead merely] a bare right of veto.”222 
This debate may be solved by the second variable parsed from case law: 
the level of legislative involvement. Under this factor, while triggering 
a constitutional amendment may be permissible, any substantial
involvement on the part of the illegal legislature may irredeemably
taint the process.223 
As an illustration, consider the two North Carolina constitutional 
amendments rejected by the Wake County Superior Court. The tax-
cap amendment would have changed only one word in the constitution 
in lowering the cap from “ten” to “seven” percent.224 This amendment 
neither contemplated nor required further legislative action. The 
voter-ID amendment, on the other hand, was not a straight up-or-down
vote. Instead, it would have allowed the same illegal legislature to 
219. William B. Fisch, Constitutional Referendum in the United States of America, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 485, 493–96 (2006) (noting that most states require a legislative supermajority to call a
constitutional convention or propose an amendment; many states have lesser restrictions if the 
amendment is proposed by popular initiative).
 220. See id. at 492–504 (describing the variety of ways that states deal with constitutional
referendums and initiatives). 
221. West v. Carr, 370 S.W.2d 469, 473 (Tenn. 1963) (“People who, acting under a proper
resolution of the legislature, vote in favor of calling a constitutional convention are presumed to
ratify the terms of the legislative call, which thereby becomes the basis of the authority delegated
to the convention.” (emphases omitted) (citation omitted)); cf. Bonfield, supra note 162, at 975.
(“If we accept petitions from malapportioned state legislatures as valid applications for a[] 
[constitutional] convention, we only permit illegitimate power to authorize Congress to initiate
or trigger a process which is constituted and operated wholly independently of that illegitimate
power.”).
 222. State ex rel. Smith v. Gore, 143 S.E.2d 791, 795 (W. Va. 1965) (relying on a provision of
the West Virginia Constitution requiring “equal representation” in all “appointments of 
representation” to require a constitutional convention use members selected from proportional 
districts). 
223. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
224. S.B. 75, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., 2017 Sess. (N.C. 2018).
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“enact general laws governing the requirements of such photographic 
identification” following voters’ affirmation that “photographic 
identification” is required for in-person voting.225 Under the second
factor, the former presents few problems; the latter, however, gives a
racially gerrymandered legislature previously chastised for targeting 
African American voters with “surgically” precise voter-ID legislation 
another bite at the apple, this time cloaked in constitutional 
authority.226 
This leads us to the third variable: the nature of the act itself.
Courts have consistently denied de facto bodies the privilege of hiding 
behind the doctrine’s precepts when their actions were bent towards 
the maintenance of illegal power—at common law, de facto officers 
could not use their office for their own gain;227 during the Civil War, 
actions in furtherance of the Confederacy received no de facto
protections;228 and in the reapportionment era, attempts to 
constitutionalize the unconstitutional were rejected.229 When it comes
to gerrymanders, courts should be most concerned by actions that seek
to maintain an illegally gerrymandered body in power by perpetuating 
its “unrepresentative condition.” Because gerrymandering is, at its 
core, a tool for the entrenchment of partisan or racial power, the 
category of actions that perpetuate its “unrepresentative condition” 
may be relatively broad. Gerrymandered power may, for example, be
perpetuated by voting restrictions, court packing, and more. 
This is not to say that any legislation passed with partisan intent 
should be struck down. The danger, rather, is at its maximum when that 
intent is crystallized in legislation that cannot be rectified by judicial or
democratic action following a resumption of representative conditions. 
225. H.B. 1092, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., 2017 Sess. (N.C. 2018).
226. This problem is attenuated by two factors. First, it is true that another, more
representative legislature could enact general laws changing which photo IDs qualify for voting
access without needing to amend the North Carolina Constitution. Thus, while the North Carolina
legislature is involved in the amendment’s rollout, it is still writing in legislative pencil, not
constitutional ink. However, this does not eliminate the potential problem—it just places a
potential expiration date on it. Moreover, artfully chosen requirements could still depress an
opposing party’s voting base enough to be determinative even in districts that are drawn to be
unbiased. So although the requirements may not be truly permanent, they may persist far longer
than the defectively gerrymandered legislature that allowed them to be created. Second, any ID
requirements still must not conflict with the federal Constitution. Political persuasion, however, 
is not a protected class, meaning an illegal legislature could still use voter-ID legislation to
disadvantage an opponent, assuming it does not trespass on other suspect classes.
 227. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
 228. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
 229. See supra notes 158–160 and accompanying text.
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To return to the North Carolina example, plaintiffs in the Wake
County case argued that both the voter-ID and tax-cap amendments 
would disproportionately harm people of color.230 But the plaintiffs had
a much stronger argument that the former was an attempt to maintain 
the “unrepresentative condition” than the latter; not only would
enforcing a voter-ID requirement literally change the rules governing 
who elects legislators, but plaintiffs could also point to the 2016 Fourth
Circuit decision in NAACP v. McCrory as smoking-gun evidence of 
what would transpire if the legislature was given the chance. Similarly, 
if the state-elections-board and judicial-vacancy amendments231 had 
survived their public referenda, they too would have allowed the 
unrepresentative legislature to preserve its power long after equitable 
maps were restored. The tax amendment, in contrast, did not 
perpetuate the gerrymandered legislature’s power, even if it may have
had a long-term discriminatory effect. 
Under the tripartite framework proposed by this Note, courts 
should be most concerned about gerrymandered legislatures’ attempts 
to entrench their power through permanent or enduring means when
they play a substantial role in crafting such means. Because the tax-cap 
amendment, though permanent, did not perpetuate the state 
legislature’s power and consisted of little more than a proposal to
change one word in the constitution, it should have been upheld by the 
North Carolina superior court. The voter-ID amendment, on the other 
hand, was not only permanent but also intimately involved a racially 
gerrymandered legislature in the possible entrenchment of racial and
political voting power. Even under the deferential standard proposed
by this Note, the voter-ID amendment would have been dead on
arrival.
CONCLUSION
Gerrymandering is “nothing new.”232 Neither is the de facto officer 
doctrine. But in the coming years, these traditional concepts will clash 
in novel ways. The equitable calculus that will govern this clash is 
dependent on the intersection of several factors, including the alleged
defect in authority, the status of the officer or government when it 
chose to act, the nature of the body collaterally attacked and its level 
230. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. Moore, No. 18 CVS 9806, slip op. at 8 (Wake
Cty. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2019). 
231. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
232. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019).
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of involvement in the legislative process, and the nature and medium 
of the challenged action itself. Given these complex and overlapping 
considerations, courts should resist a blanket and mechanical 
invocation of the de facto doctrine in favor of the equitable balancing 
approach that lies at the doctrine’s heart. 
A gerrymandered legislature unmasked as such has not only lost 
its color of authority, but is also burdened with serious, intentionally 
created constitutional defects that weigh heavily against the sufferance
of unfettered power. Moreover, even though widespread invalidation 
of past legislative acts would undoubtedly cause societal chaos, fears of
confusion and anarchy are greatly diminished in the prospective realm.
Although illegally constituted legislatures must be permitted some 
authority until they are replaced, courts should be particularly wary of 
legislative attempts to cling to power. Ultimately, the de facto officer 
and related savings doctrines were created to protect the public; they
should not be used to entrench power at the public’s expense. 
